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DIVERSITY JURISDICTION FOR UNINCORPORATED
ASSOCIATIONS
Although unincorporated associations-joint stock companies, labor
unions, partnerships, fraternal orders, etc.-exist in a "myriad of struc-
tural arrangements,"' as a general proposition each is liable for the
activities of its members when the activity has been authorized, sup-
ported, or ratified by the association. 2 Therefore, when the association is
sued in a federal court, under diversity jurisdiction, the court must
determine the association's citizenship. Since, according to Strawbridge
v. Curtiss,3 diversity jurisdiction requires that all plaintiffs be of citizen.
ship different from all defendants, associations will often have limited
access to federal courts if they have citizenship in every state in which a
member has citizenship.
The Supreme Court dealt with this problem first in Chapman v.
Barney4 which established the rule that citizenship of the association's
members controlled for diversity purposes. In that case the Court
refused to extend to associations the rule of Marshall v. Baltimore &g
O.R.R.,5 which presumed that all stockholders of a corporation were
citizens of the state of incorporation, and treated the corporation as a
citizen of that state.0 Two recent circuit court opinions, however, have
1. ALI, STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS,
74 (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 1965), [hereinafter cited as ALl, PROPOSED FINAL DRAFr].
2. In Sperry Products, Inc. v. Association of American Railroads, 132 F.2d 408, 410-12
(2d Cir. 1942), cert. denied, 319 U.S. 744 (1943), the court held that the liability for actions
of members could be imputed to the entire association provided that those members were
authorized to act by the association. See also Fredstrom v. Giroux Post No. 11 of American
Legion, 94 F. Supp. 983 (W.D. Mich. 1951). For a discussion of the liability of labor union
see Witmar, Trade Union Liability: The Problem of the Unincorporated Corporation,
51 YALE LJ. 40 (1941). Cf., UMW v. Coronado Coal Co., 259 U.S. 344, 391 (1922) (Inter-
national not held liable for the actions of the local since It was acting upon its own
initiative).
3. 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267 (1806).
4. 129 U.S. 677 (1889). In Chapman the Court held that a joint stock association was
incapable of possessing citizenship since it lacked a corporate charter. 129 U.S. at 682. An
earlier district court case had taken judicial notice of the fact that under tile laws of
New York joint stock associations were "corporations without the name," and held that
such an association was a citizen of New York. Maltz v. American Express Co., 16 Fed.
Cas. 566 (No. 9002) (C.C.E.D. Mich. 1876).
5. 57 U.S. (16 How.) 314 (1853).
6. Marshall modified the earlier holding, in Louisville R.R. v. Leston, 48 U.S. (2 How.)
497, 558 (1844), that a corporation is "capable of being treated as a citizen of [the state
of its incorporation], as much as a natural person," by creating the fiction that although
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forced reconsideration of this issue. In Mason v. American Express
Co.,7 the Second Circuit rejected the old rule and held that an unin-
corporated joint stock association should be treated as a citizen of the
state under whose laws it was organized and in which it had its principal
place of business. The circuit court claimed that the Supreme Court's
opinion in Puerto Rico v. Russell" "abandoned the artificial and
mechanical rule .. . in favor of a more flexible test for capacity for
citizenship," 9 and allowed the circuit court to treat the American
Express Company like a corporation.0 In Bouligny, Inc. v. United
Steelworkers" the Fourth Circuit rejected the Second Circuit's de-
cision 12 and applied the Chapman rule. The Fourth Circuit properly
found Russell completely inapplicable.
The Court [in Russell] by analogy to a common law corporation
held that the defendant, a civil law Sociedad, had a domicil in
Puerto Rico and thus could not claim the domicil of its individual
members to acquire the non-resident status required by the
Organic Act. Clearly the case does not by any stretch of the imagi-
nation hold that the Sociedad was a citizen of Puerto Rico for
purposes of diversity jurisdiction under Article 111.13
a corporation's citizenship was that of all its stockholders, it was to be irrebutably pre-
sumed that those stockholders were citizens of the state of incorporation. Louisville had
itself changed the early rule of corporate citizenship set out in the Bank of the United
States v. Devaux, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 61, 89-91 (1809), which was similar to that announced
for associations in Chapman.
7. 534 F.2d 392 (2d Cir. 1964).
8. 288 U.S. 476 (1933).
9. 334 F.2d at 393. Cf. Van Sant v. American Express Co., 159 F.2d 355 (3d Cir. 1948).
10. The characteristics which the American Express Company possessed which made
it similar to a corporation were listed in the opinion of the district court: 1) the asso-
ciation did not dissolve or liquidate on the death of an associate as did a partnership;
2) the association could hold real property in the name of its President; 3) the powers
of management could be concentrated in a few associates who formed a self perpetuating
managing body; and 4) the association could sue or be sued without making all of the asso-
ciates parties to the action. 224 F. Supp. at 290.
But after finding that the American Express Company had these characteristics of a
corporation, the district court held that the association differed from a corporation in
a significant respect-individual shareholders could be held liable for the debts of the
association, and therefore the express company could not be treated as a corporation for
purposes of federal jurisdiction. The Second Circuit found, however, the "theoretical
liability of individual shareholders actually becoming operative . . highly unlikely."
334 F.2d at 401.
11. 336 F.2d 160 (4th Cir. 1964), cert. granted, 379 U.S. 958 (1965).
12. 336 F.2d at 163 n.3.
13. Id. at 163. The Organic Act, ch. 145, § 41, 89 Stat. 965 (1917). 48 U.S.C. § 863
(1958), reads: "The United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico shall ...
have jurisdiction of all controversies where all of the parties on either side of the con-
troversy are citizens ... of a State, Territory, or District of the United States not domiciled
in Puerto Rico ...." Compare the Organic Act with 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (1958) which
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The Supreme Court has granted certiorari in the Bouligny case 14 and
presumably the conflict between the Fourth and Second Circuits will
be resolved this term. It would not be sufficient for the Supreme Court
merely to rest its decision upon Chapman. More than sixty years have
passed since the Court considered directly the citizenship of unincor-
porated associations.'5 In that period there has been extensive reevalua-
tion of diversity jurisdiction, 0 as well as congressional action based in
part upon this reevaluation.' 7 These developments suggest that the
Court should reconsider the Chapman rule.
Originally federal jurisdiction over controversies "between citizens
of different states"' 8 was considered necessary to protect out-of-state
litigants from local prejudice in state courts.'9 It was feared that a
foreign litigant would be prejudiced by placing his case before a hostile
and provincial jury20 and by litigating in a court with unfamiliar and
perhaps inadequate procedure.21 Furthermore, impartial application of
reads: "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions where the
matter in controversy .. . is between-(1) citizens of different states; . , ," See, Puerto
Rico v. Russell & Co., 288 U.S. 476, 478-79 (1933).
14. 379 U.S. 958 (1965).
15. The Court has not faced the question directly since Thomas V. Board of Trustees,
195 U.S. 207 (1904).
16. See Friendly, The Historic Basis of Diversity Jurisdiction, 41 HARV. L. Rmv, 488
(1928); Frankfurter, Distribution of Judicial Power between United States and State Courts,
13 CoRNE.L L.Q. 499 (1928); ALI, STuDY OF THE DIVISION OF JuRISDlarloN BETWEEN STATE
AND FEDERAL COURTS, pp. 37-38 (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1963) [Hereinafter cited as ALI TENT.
DRAFT No. 1]; Parker, The Federal Jurisdiction and Recent Attacks Upon It, 18 ABAJ 488
(1932).
17. 28 U.S.C. § 1882 (c) (1958). See S. REP. No. 1830, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., 18 (1958),
for the considerations underlying this congressional action.
18. U.S. CoNsT. art. III, § 2.
19. See authorities cited at note 16 supra.
20. It is true that both the state and federal courts draw their juries from the district
in which a case is to be tried, but
State venue provisions often localize the place of trial in small constituencies. In
these circumstances justice is likely to be impeded by the provincialism of the local
judge and jury.... But the federal courts, with their juries drawn on a district-wide
basis and with their judges appointed for life ... have always protected out-of-staters
from this type of inadequacy of justice.
ALI, TENT. DRAr No. I, p. 41.
21. Id. at 37-38. Not only might the procedures in a state be inadequate with respect
to such important safeguards for an out-of-state plaintiff as procedures by which the
judge can control the jury, but also, the out-of-stater who is familiar with the practices
of his own state might find himself totally at a loss in a foreign state.
But see Baxter, Choice of Law and the Federal System, 16 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1963), where
he points out that the procedural disadvantages that the out-of-stater would face would
have been no less in the federal courts, as the federal courts, prior to the Federal Rules,
were required to follow state procedural rules. Professor Baxter suggests that "the kind
of prejudice to be avoided was the application, in cases involving noncitizens of the
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the law could not always be expected from judges whose method of
appointment and tenure often placed them at the mercy of local
politics.Y
Some commentators have questioned the validity of these fears.?
Some argue that even if local prejudice existed in 1789 it does not
exist now.24 There are others, however, who feel that actual or feared
prejudice still exists to support the continuation of diversity jurisdic-
tion.25 These claim that a belief in local prejudice, even if unsubstan-
tiated, justifies federal diversity jurisdiction, since it forestalls the
development of a foreign party's animosity towards citizens of a sister
state whose tribunals gave him what he believed to be less than a fair
trial.26 The tendency to defend diversity jurisdiction on the grounds of
apprehension about local prejudice is understandable. It is extremely
difficult to obtain evidence concerning the actual effect of prejudice
upon the outcome of state litigation,2 7 but it is relatively easy to obtain
opinion samples which stress apprehension.-28
forum, of the rules of law of the forum," as it was thought that "unworthy principles"
might be enacted by the states, and men should be protected from such principles of
states other than their own by resort to federal law. Id. at 37-39.
22. Friendly, supra note 16 at 497.
23. See, e.g., id. at 493-94.
24. Friendly points out that "[Diversity jursdiction] had its origin in fears of local
hostilities, which had only a speculative existence in 1789, and are still less real today.
The unifying tendencies of America here make for a recession of jurisdiction to the states,
rather than an extension of federal authority." Id. at 510.
It has been suggested that since Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), requiring
the federal courts to follow the substantive law of the forum state in diversity cases, it
is no longer reasonable to continue diversity jurisdiction, as the state courts are much
more competent to apply their own substantive law than are the federal courts.
... With the increasing permeation of national feeling and the mobility of modern
life, little excuse is left for diversity jurisdiction, now that Erie . ..has put a stop
to the unwarranted freedom of the federal courts to fashion rules of local law in
defiance of local law.
Lumbermen's Casualty Co. v. Elbert, 348 U.S. 48, 56 (1954) (Frankfurter, J. concurring).
25. "There is a great bulk of expert opinion from those who litigate in the courts
that local prejudice continues to exist, and that the Federal courts are in truth a strong
protection against it." S. REP'. No. 1830, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 18 (1958). A recent survey of
Virginia lawyers revealed that the great majority of them preferred a federal forum
whenever possible in order to avoid the consequences of local prejudice. Note, The Choice
Between State and Federal Court in Diversity Cases in Virginia, 51 VA. L. Rrv. 178 (1965);
Moore & Weckstein, Diversity Jurisdiction: Past, Present, and Future, 43 Ts-cs L. REv.
1, 15-16 (1965).
26. Id. at 18-19; ALI, PROPOSED FNAL D -rr, 55-56.
27. Since diversity jurisdiction has been continuously provided by various statutes
since the first Judiciary Act of 1789, it is difficult to assess the degree to which local
prejudice would effect the outcome of litigation in the absence of the jurisdiction.
28. See, eg., Note, The Choice Between State and Federal Court in Diversity Cases in
Virginia, 51 VA. L. REv. 178 (1965).
1965]
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Professors Moore and Weckstein agree with the apprehension ration-
ale, but also feel that federal jurisdiction in cases arising under similar
state statutes, such as uniform commercial codes and uniform partner-
ship acts, will lead to greater consistency in the interpretation of these
statutes.29 However, a posited higher quality of federal justice, which
Moore and Weckstein describe as "perhaps the most 'common sense'
contemporary justification for the jurisdiction," 0 is probably their
foremost reason for supporting diversity. However persuasive these
arguments may be they apply to federal jurisdiction generally and not
specifically to the fact of diverse citizenship.81
It is clear that the traditional functions of diversity jurisdiction are a
questionable basis for its continuation. None of the proponents of
diversity can state unequivocally that local prejudice exists, or that it
is a significant factor in the outcome of state court litigation. Nor are
they able to state precisely what the effect of fear of prejudice would be
if diversity jurisdiction did not exist. It is equally clear, though, that
the critics of the jurisdiction have been unable to prove the absence of
local prejudice, the absence of apprehension, or the absence of harmful
effects resulting from the apprehension.
This failure of the commentators to establish a conclusive case either
for or against diversity jurisdiction is reflected in a failure of Congress
to adopt a consistent approach towards the jurisdiction. In 1958, Con-
gress amended the diversity statute 2 to make corporations citizens of
the state in which they have their principal place of business and of the
state in which they are incorporated. Congress reasoned that a corpora-
tion "is so closely tied to the local commercial fabric of that state [of
its principal place of business] as to be properly considered a citizen
thereof, even though it may have been incorporated elsewhere." 0
Foreign corporations which were "closely tied to the commercial fabric"
of a state could not realistically claim that they were strangers to that
state and therefore subject to prejudice. But the 1958 legislation did not
29. Moore & Weckstein, supra note 25 at 20.
30. Id. at 21.
31. Arguments similar to those presented by Moore & Weckstein, supra note 25, are
advanced by Frank, For Maintaining Diversity Jurisdiction, 73 YAIE L.J. 7 (1963).
32. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c) (1958).
33. Report of the Committee on Jurisdiction and Venue of the Judicial Conference of
the United States, S. REP. No. 1830, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 20-21 (1958). It was felt that the
1958 amendment, by eliminating "cases involving corporations which come into Federal
district courts on the fictional premise that diversity of citizenship exists" would reduce
the workload of the federal courts. S. RE,. No. 1830, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1958); Hearing
Before the House Committee on Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts Concerning Diversity
of citizenship, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1957).
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completely correlate the citizenship of corporations with the possibility
of prejudice. Congress might have prevented a corporation from in-
voking diversity jurisdiction against citizens of states in which the cor-
poration had local establishments when the cause of action arose out of
the activities of the local establishment.3 4 Here, too, the corporation
could not claim that it was really a stranger. But Congress had con-
flicting purposes. Although it did wish to correlate diversity jurisdiction
with local prejudice, perhaps inconsistently it did not desire a great
restriction of corporate access to the federal courts. 3
In spite of this conflict it is fair to say that Congress has accepted, at
least in part, the theory that diversity jurisdiction protects against local
prejudice. The Supreme Court should begin its review of Bouligny,
then, by finding a rule which best effectuates this policy of diversity.
The two rules presently used by the courts to treat unincorporated
associations are unsuccessful.
The Chapman rule is inconsistent with the functions of diversity
jurisdiction since it prevents access to a federal court if merely one of
the hundreds or thousands of members of an association is a citizen of
the same state as an opposing party. If a New Jersey plaintiff sued an
association which was active solely in New York and most of whose
members were citizens of that state, the local prejudice he would suffer
at the hands of a New York court would not be affected by the fact that
one or several members of the association lived in New Jersey.
Also inconsistent with the purposes of diversity is the rule which
allows class actions against unincorporated associations. In a class action
34. The ALI has proposed that:
No corporation ... and no partnership, unincorporated association, or sole proprietor-
ship . . . which has and for a period of more than two years has maintained a
local establishment in a State, can invoke [diversity] jurisdiction . .. in any district
in that State in any action arising out of the activities of that establishment. ....
The provisions of this subsection shall apply only to entities organized or operated
primarily for the purposes of conducting a trade, investment, or other business
enterprise.
AL PRoPosED FnAL DRAFT § 1302(b).
35. Proposals have been made that corporations should be treated as a citizen of any
state in which they are doing business. H.R. 1987, 82 Cong., 2d Sess. (1952). But the
Committee on Jurisdiction and Venue of the Judicial Conference of the United States
felt that this would too greatly deny corporations "the sort of protection which they
need against local prejudice and the benefit of the salutory rules and practice of the
Federal Courts." S. REP. No. 1830, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 20 (1958).
The conflict of purpose is also revealed in the congressional treatment of diversity
jurisdiction for individuals. No restrictions are placed upon bringing a diversity action
in one's own state, where there could be no danger of local prejudice. 28 U.S.C. § 1332
(1958). But, an individual may not remove to a federal court a case brought against him
in the courts of his own state. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) (1948).
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only the citizenship of the named representatives is considered in deter-
mining whether diversity exists. Thus if an association wishes to sue in
the federal courts it can create diversity by carefully selecting certain
members as representatives of the class. In a similar manner, an indi-
vidual plaintiff suing an association can create diversity. For example,
in Calagaz v. Calhoon3G the plaintiff, a local union, sued the national
union for activities which had taken place in the plaintiff's state, Ala-
bama. Since some officials of the national union were citizens of Ala-
bama, to name it as a party to the suit would have defeated diversity
jurisdiction. Therefore, the local elected to sue the national in a class
action and selected as representatives of the class only officers who were
not citizens of Alabama. Such a class action allows federal jurisdiction
even when the majority of the association's members have the same
citizenship as the opposing party and presumably local prejudice would
not be a factor.
Since neither treatment of unincorporated associations relates to local
prejudice, the Supreme Court should reject both and seek more re-
sponsive rules. The Court could avoid the effects of Chapman by over-
ruling Strawbridge v. Curtiss,3 7 which required complete diversity.
However, this treatment would not be related to local prejudice since
diversity of citizenship between only one member of an association and
an opposing party would suffice to bring a case into federal court 88
Moreover, overruling Strawbridge would expand federal diversity juris-
diction in many other areas and therefore would be contrary to recent
congressional action 9
The Court might turn to the treatment adopted by the Second
Circuit in Mason v. American Express Co.40 Relying upon the similar-
ity between a joint stock company and a corporation, the court gave the
36. 309 F.2d 248 (5th Cir. 1962).
37. 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267 (1806).
38. Professors Moore and Weckstein argue that the complete diversity requirement of
Strawbridge is not demanded by the terms of the jurisdictional grant in the Constitution,
and that if any plaintiff and one defendant are of diverse citizenship, the terms of the
Constitutional grant of jurisdiction will be met. Diversity Jurisdiction: Past, Present and
Future, 43 TEx. L. REv. 1, 27-28 (1965). See also Supporting Memorandum A, ALl P1to-
POsED FINAL DRAFr 127-38, which draws a similar conclusion concerning the Constitutional
status of Strawbridge.
39. The congressional hearings on the 1958 amendment to 28 U.S.C. § 1332 refer to
the aim of reducing the burden of federal courts. See materials cited at note 33 supra.
See also 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d) (1964) which dealt specifically with diversity of citizenship
when a plaintiff sues an insurance company, whether incorporated or not, under a direct
action statute, but which, indicated Congress' desire to limit access to the federal courts.
40. 334 F.2d 392 (2d Cir. 1964). See text following note 7 supra.
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association the same citizenship it would have had if it were in fact a
corporation-the state where it maintained its principal place of busi-
ness. Mason was more responsive to the functions of diversity jurisdic-
tion than Chapman. Since the association was located in and directed its
operations from New York, it would face no more prejudice in that
state than a New York corporation. However, Mason would not be
successful in all cases. The American Express Company, while so in-
volved in New York that it should not be entitled to invoke the
stranger's right to a federal forum, might also be similarly involved in
other states. Yet, under Mason, the association would be allowed a
federal forum in actions against the citizens of these states.
An alternative approach would be to make an association a citizen of
every state in which it is locally established.41 It might be argued that if
an association has active branches or locals within a state, it should not
be treated as an out-of-stater who is likely to suffer prejudice in the
state's courts.42 The association has chosen to be present in the state,
and it has ample opportunity to become acquainted with and even to
affect the administration of the state's judicial system.4 3 However, if an
association was involved in state litigation but its local branches were
not, the court might never know of the existence of the local branch,
and the association would face the same prejudice as any other foreign
party. Conversely, a plaintiff who sued an association in a state in which
it exercised a dominant influence would not be protected from local
prejudice simply because a branch of the association was located in his
home state.
The most responsive alternative would treat an association as a
citizen only of that state in which it had its principal place of business,"
but would not allow it to invoke diversity jurisdiction in a state in
which it had a local business establishment when the action arose out of
the activities of that establishment.45 Also, no party could invoke diver-
41. See note 35 supra.
42. See ALI, PRoPosEr FrNAL DnA"r 57.
43. Id. at 56-57.
44. ifihe district courts shall have jurisdiction, original or on removal of any civil
action between-
(1) citizens of different States...
(b) For the purposes of this section...
(2) . ... A partnership or other unincorporated association capable of suing or
being sued as an entity in the State in which the action is brought shall be
deemed a citizen of the State . . .where it has its principal place of busi-
ness. ...
Id. § 1301(a)(b).
45. Id. § 1302(b), quoted at note 34 supra.
1965
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
sity jurisdiction in his own state.40 This proposal avoids many of the
difficulties of the previous suggestions. First, it does not prevent the
association from invoking diversity jurisdiction unless it is clear that the
local state court will be aware of the local establishment's existence. And
second, the proposal does not deprive the association's opponent of his
right to federal diversity jurisdiction unless his state and the associa-
tion's principle place of business are the same, even though the associa-
tion might have a local establishment in his state.47 Unfortunately a
court cannot adopt this proposal without disregarding Congress since
the proposal contravenes the diversity and removal statutes, 48 and is
inconsistent with the present treatment of individuals and corporations,
both of whom can invoke diversity jurisdiction in their own state. If
the proposal is adopted it is Congress which must authorize these
inconsistencies.4 9
The Court, then, is left with two alternatives. Either it can simply
follow Chapman upon the theory that the policies of predictability and
stabilization of expectations should be advanced. Or the Court can over-
rule Chapman and treat associations as much like corporations as pos-
sible. The first of these alternatives would be a misapplication of stare
decisis. The Chapman rule has not, in fact, proven predictable. The
use of class actions and decisions like Mason have undercut the rule
significantly, and have made following Chapman on the grounds of
predictability senseless.
The second alternative is the only feasible one for the Court. The
Court should rationalize the law dealing with associations and the law
dealing with corporations by adopting a principal place of business test
for association citizenship since it is the only test closely resembling the
treatment of corporations. Prior to the 1958 amendment, this ratio-
46. Id. § 1302(a).
47. The fact that the association has a branch in the plaintiff's state would seem to
eliminate any disadvantage to either party in state courts, but were the plaintiff to sue
the national association in the state of its principal place of business, the fact that the
association was located in his home state would not save him from the partiality towards
the national association, nor would it help him surmount the difficulty of facing an un-
familiar state procedure.
48. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332, 1391, and 1441. If the association's citizenship were defined as
being in the state of its principal place of business, under these statutes, the association
would be allowed to bring a diversity action in any state where all plaintiffs or all defend-
ants reside, and it would be able to remove an action on grounds of diversity jurisdiction.
49. The ALI's proposals were advanced as a part of a comprehensive legislative scheme
which would, if enacted, significantly change the statutes cited supra note 48, providing
for the bringing and removing of diversity actions. They would treat corporations, asso-
ciations and individuals similarly in limiting their access to federal courts in those states
in which they are active participants. See generally AL, PROPOSED FINAL DPar.
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nalization would have been more difficult, since the earlier treatment
of corporations was based upon the existence of a charter, a basis which
could not be applied to unnicorporated associations. But the 1958
legislation, by attributing to corporations a citizenship of their princi-
pal place of business, also provided a means that could be used to deal
with unincorporated associations.50 The application of this test would
allow similar entities to be treated similarly. This rationalization should
outveigh the fact that although the 1958 amendment reduced corporate
access to federal courts, its application to unincorporated associations
would increase their access. Moreover, the functions Congress intended
the 1958 legislation to serve would be served also by treating unin-
corporated associations as citizens of their principal place of business.51
Treating unincorporated associations like corporations would present
some administrative difficulties, for example in pleading jurisdictional
facts. It is a settled rule that a plaintiff must allege positively the facts
upon which the court's jurisdiction depends.5 2 If this rule forced the
plaintiff to locate the association's principal place of business, it would
impose a burden upon the plaintiff that he would often be unable to
meet. The difficulty of showing the precise location of a principal place
of business has been avoided in suits against corporations under the
1958 amendment by allowing plaintiff to plead that the corporation
50. The Bouligny court argued from a different direction, suggesting that prior to the
1958 amendment the courts could "substantially equate unincorporated associations with
corporations by a minor feat of interpretation." United Steelworkers of America v. Bou-
ligny, Inc., 336 F.2d 160, 164 (4th Cir. 194). But in making this argument, the court did
not face the difficulty confronting a judge in the face of the rationale for corporations
based on the existence of a charter.
It might also be suggested that it would be improper for the courts to adopt the princi-
pal place of business test for association citizenship, since Congress failed to include un-
incorporated associations in 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c) (1958); but see 28 U..C. § 1332(d) (1964)
dealing with a specific form of unincorporated association. There is no indication that
Congress even considered the status of unincorporated associations in 1958, and the failure
of Congress to enact a rule governing the citizenship of associations in 1958 is not equiva-
lent to congressional action denying them citizenship for jurisdictional purposes.
True it is that when a rule has been established by legislation, however undesirable
it may be, it is for the legislature alone to remedy the situation. ... But when the
rule is one of common law established by the courts the remedy lies with either the
Legislature or the courts, and inaction by the one does not preclude action by
the other.
Reimann v. Monmouth Consolidated Water Co., 9 NJ. 134, 150, 87 A.2d 325, 333 (1952)
(Vanderbilt, C. J. dissenting).
51. Congress did intend by the 1958 amendment to relate the citizenship of corpora-
tions for diversity purposes to the likelihood that they would experience local prejudice
in the states in which they did business. See Browne v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 168 F. Supp.
796, 798 (N.D. Ill. 1959). See also legislative material cited supra note 33.
52. 2 MooRE, FEDERAL PRA c c, 8.07 [1], 1639 (2d ed. 194).
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"does not have its principal place of business in the state . . of which
the plaintiff is a citizen," and is incorporated in a particular state
different from the plaintiff's. 8 However, perhaps the pleadings allowed
for suits against corporations are not relevant in suits against associa-
tions, since the corporate pleading at least establishes the corporation
as citizen in the incorporating state." But it is not necessary to rely
solely upon the corporate pleading analogy since there is other authority
that plaintiff may allege merely that the association's citizenship is
different from his own, without locating its precise citizenship.5 This
pleading would meet the requirement of the positive averment of
jurisdiction, since the pleading establishes that plaintiff and defendant
are citizens of different states. Defendant should not be allowed merely
to deny that its principal place of business is in a state other than the
plaintiff's; in order to defeat diversity jurisdiction it should be required
to allege either that its principal place of business is in the plaintiff's
state or that it has no principal place of business and is therefore not a
citizen of any state. The burden of proving the former allegation should
be on the defendant, because the information to locate the association's
principal place of business would be peculiarly in its possession, and
because it would be extremely difficult for the plaintiff to disprove
defendant's allegation. An allegation of statelessness should probably
place upon the plaintiff the burden of showing that the defendant asso-
ciation did have a principal place of business in some stateY0 When an
53. 2 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE, 8.10, 1658 n.24 (2d ed. 1964).
54. For diversity jurisdiction to be established, it is not sufficient merely to allege that
plaintiff and defendant are not citizens of the same state, for if one party is stateless, they
will not be "citizens of different states" and there will be no federal jurisdiction. Blair
Holdings Corp. v. Rubinstein, 122 F. Supp. 602 (S.D.N.Y. 1954).
55. In Douglas v. United Electrical Workers, 127 F. Supp. 795 (E.D. Mich. 1955),
plaintiff sued an unincorporated labor union and certain individuals. Jurisdiction was
not established with respect to the union, as there was no allegation of the citizenship
of its individual members, but the court held that the union was not an indispensable
party, and that the action could have been maintained against the individual defendants
if jurisdiction had been properly alleged. Plaintiff had alleged that the individual de-
fendants were "non-residents" of the State of Michigan, and the court held that If the
plaintiff had alleged instead that they were "residents of a state other than Michigan,"
jurisdiction would have been established. The court's language suggests that an allegation
of the particular states of which the individual defendants were citizens would not have
been required. Id. at 796. In Blair Holdings Corp. v. Rubinstein, supra note 54, the plain-
tiff only alleged that Rubinstein was not a citizen of the United States, but it also pre-
sented affidavits that Rubinstein was a citizen of either the USSR or of Portugal. This
indefinite averment of the defendant's citizenship would have been sufficient If he had
not denied that he was a citizen of any nation, thus putting on the plaintiff the burden
of proving that he was a citizen of some foreign state. Id. at 603.
56. If the facts necessary to establish jurisdiction are denied by the defendant, the
plaintiff normally has the burden of proving them. 2 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE, 8.07 [1),
1640 (2d ed. 1964); Blair Holdings Corp. v. Rubinstein, supra note 54.
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association is plaintiff it should be required, as are corporations, to allege
the specific location of its principal place of business.
Were the Supreme Court to adopt a principal place of business test,
further action would be required to prevent the use of the class action
device to avoid this rule, as it has avoided Chapman in the past." Possi-
bilities of circumvention could be eliminated if the courts looked
beyond the citizenship of the named representatives and imputed the
citizenship of the association to them. Since the rights and liabilities of
the representatives would have been determined by the activities of the
association," the imputation would be justified. In other cases involving
similar devices for the arbitrary creation of diversity, the courts have
looked beyond the parties before them. For example, when a cause of
action has been assigned, federal courts will determine whether the
assignor would have been able to invoke diversity jurisdiction, and if
not, the courts will not allow the assignee's action. 9 Therefore if the
Supreme Court follows the 1958 amendments, and adopts a principal
place of business test for unincorporated associations, the Court also
can insure that the rule be effective by eliminating the class action
abuses.
57. See text accompanying note 36 supra.
The class action abuse could be eliminated by a ruling by the Court that associations
cannot sue or be sued in class actions under FED. PL Ctv. P. 23(a), since the association
as an entity is not within the definition applying the Rule to parties too numerous to
be brought before the court. But such a ruling would make it impossible for associations
to sue or be sued in Federal court in the few states where associations may not be sued
as an entity. FED. R. Civ. P 17(b) requires that Federal courts follow state law to determine
a litigant's capacity to sue or be sued.
58. The class action determines the rights and liabilities of the class as a whole. Su-
preme Tribe of Ben-Hur v. Cauble, 255 U.S. 356 (1921). Those who sue or defend as
representatives of a class are presumed to represent the rights of the class as a whole.
SToRY, EQurry PLwADncs § 107 (10th ed. 1892).
59. In Le Mieux Bros., Inc. v. Tremont Lumber Co., 140 F.2d 387 (5th Cir. 1944).
the court, following 28 U.S.C. § 41(1) (1940), held that if an action was assigned, diversity
jurisdiction could be invoked only if it would have been proper had the assignor brought
the action. Congress revised this statute to read:
A district court shall not have jurisdiction of a civil action in which any party, by
assignment or otherwise, has improperly or collusively been made or joined to invoke
the jurisdiction of such court.
28 U.S.C. § 1359 (1958). The notes to this revision explain that its purpose was to prevent
the arbitrary control of choice of forum which would otherwise be available to a plaintiff
who could assign hisause of action to create diversity.
